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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jorge A. Lopez-Orozco appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdicts finding him guilty of three counts of first-degree murder.
Lopez-Orozco claims the district court committed evidentiary error.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In 2002, Lopez-Orozco murdered Rebecca Ramirez Alamaraz and her two
young sons, four-year-old R.R. and two-year-old M.H. (See Exhibits 177-179.)
Lopez-Orozco drove the bodies to a desert area in Mountain Home and set the
car they were in on fire, burning their bodies, leaving only bone fragments from
which to identify them. 1 (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1562, Ls.6-21; Exhibits 177-179.) On
August 16, 2002, the state filed a Complaint charging Lopez-Orozco with three
counts of first-degree murder for the deaths of Rebecca and her two sons. (R.,
Vol. I, pp.9-11; Exhibits 177-179.)

After the murders, Lopez-Orozco fled to

Mexico; he was finally extradited back to Idaho in 2011 and the court held a
three-day preliminary hearing after which it found probable cause to support the
three first-degree murder charges against Lopez-Orozco. (R., Vol. I, pp.61-83,
88-90, 91-95; see Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2146, L.25 - p.2147, L.6 (noting Lopez-Orozco
"remained at large from July 31st of 2002 until October of 2009").) Lopez-Orozco
pied not guilty and the case proceeded to trial at which a jury convicted him of all
three counts. (R., Vol. I, p.96; R., Vol. IV, pp.642-644.) The court imposed three

Both Rebecca and M.H. had gunshot wounds to their heads, but R.R.'s cause
of death was undetermined. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1847, L.2 - p.1848, L.20.)
1

1

concurrent fixed life sentences. (R., Vol. IV, pp.653-654.) Lopez-Orozco filed a
timely notice of appeal. 2 (R., Vol. IV, pp.656-658.)

2

The state also filed a notice of cross-appeal (R., Vol. IV, pp.664-666); however,
contemporaneous with this response, the state filed a motion to dismiss its crossappeal.
2

ISSUES
Lopez-Orozco states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court err in ruling that Jose Lopez-Orozco was an
unavailable witness and then admitting his preliminary hearing
testimony?
2. Did the district court err in allowing Jose's unsworn declaration
to be read to the jury?
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.)

The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Lopez-Orozco failed to show the district court erred in admitting
Jose's preliminary hearing testimony along with his prior statement, which was
also admitted at the preliminary hearing?

3

ARGUMENT
Lopez-Orozco Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Allowing The
Admission, At Trial, Of His Brother Jose's Preliminary Hearing Testimony And
The Content Of A Written Statement Jose Signed In 2009, Which Statement Was
Also Admitted At The Preliminary Hearing
A.

Introduction
On June 15, 2011, Lopez-Orozco's brother, Jose, provided some limited

testimony at Lopez-Orozco's preliminary hearing regarding statements LopezOrozco made in 2002. (6/15/2011 P.H. Tr., pp.249-260, 380-397.) At LopezOrozco's trial more in 2012, 3 Jose testified that he could not recall any of LopezOrozco's statements, any statements he made to law enforcement regarding
what he heard Lopez-Orozco say, or his preliminary hearing testimony. (Tr., Vol.
Ill, p.2017, L.23 - p.2018, L.9.) As a result, the prosecutor asked the court to
declare Jose unavailable as a witness and allow Jose's preliminary hearing
testimony to be read to the jury along with the contents of a written statement he
signed for law enforcement in 2009 in which he detailed Lopez-Orozco's
statements from 2002. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2018, L.20 - p.2020, L.3.) The court found
Jose unavailable and granted the state's request to have Jose's preliminary
hearing testimony along with the contents of his 2009 statement read to the jury.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2023, L.22 - p.2025, L.20.)
Lopez-Orozco claims the court erred in finding Jose unavailable, arguing
the "prosecutor's inquiry" in this regard was "insufficient."

(Appellant's Brief,

pp.6-9.) This Court should decline to consider Lopez-Orozco's claim regarding

3

Jose appeared at Lopez-Orozco's trial on October 29, 2012.
p.2016, Ls.12-15.)
4

(Tr., Vol. Ill,

unavailability because it is not preserved.

Even if preserved, Lopez-Orozco's

argument regarding Jose's unavailability fails. Lopez-Orozco's other arguments
relating to the admission of Lopez-Orozco's preliminary hearing testimony and
his 2009 written statement likewise fail. Application of the relevant law to the
record shows the district court correctly concluded that both the prior testimony
and the statement were admissible. Even if this Court concludes otherwise, any
error is harmless.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its

judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion."
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted).
When the appellate court reviews an evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion, it
considers (1) whether the trial court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent
with any applicable legal standards; and (3) whether the trial court exercised
reason in reaching its decision. State v. Hoak, 147 Idaho 919, 921, 216 P.3d
1291, 1293 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation omitted).

C.

Lopez-Orozco Has Failed To Show Error In The Admission Of Jose's
Preliminary Hearing Testimony Or His 2009 Written Statement
Prior to the state calling Jose as a witness, the court conducted a hearing

on the admissibility of Jose's preliminary hearing testimony and the statement he
signed for law enforcement in 2009. (Tr., Vol. Ill, pp.1973-2008.) The prosecutor
noted that she anticipated Jose was going to testify that he did not "remember
5

anything," in which case she asked that the court find him unavailable and allow
the state to admit his preliminary hearing testimony. 4 (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1977, Ls.310.) In response defense counsel argued:
It seems to me looking at this matter in the brief time we have had
that the State has to show, according to Ricks[5], that the people to
testify, Jose and Balvina, are the only persons whose testimony
provides statements of substantial evidence on every material
element of the offence charged.
Now, they may be able to provide substantial evidence on -while they can provide substantial evidence perhaps on flight, but
that is not part of the offence charged.
As far as premeditation-premeditation murder they are not
the only people that can testify to this. We have had testimony
from Noemi who said, "The last person I saw my mother with was
the defendant." We have the other testimony from the investigating
officers as to its being the defendant's car. We have other
testimony and we are expected to have testimony from Dr. Groben
as to the three bodies found in the automobile, as to the cause of
death by Marla Spence, two of them being gunshot, one of them
being undetermined.
So these are not the only people who can provide evidence,
substantial evidence on every material element of the offence
charged. So they haven't met that threshold level just based on
testimony you have had so far.
(Tr., Vol. 111, p.1978, L.1 - p.1979, L.2.)
Counsel also argued that the "major issue" was "whether or not the scope
and the adequacy and opportunity of [his] work at the preliminary hearing
comports with [Idaho Code] 9-366 [sic]" and the "Idaho Rules of Evidence and

The prosecutor's comments related to the anticipated testimony of both Jose
and Lopez-Orozco's sister, Balvina. (See R., Vol. Ill, p.1977, L.3 - p.1978, L.7.)
4

Defense counsel is presumably referring to State v. Ricks, 122 Idaho 856, 840
P.2d 00 (Ct. App. 1992), which discussed the requirements for admission of a
preliminary hearing transcript under I.C. § 9-336.
5

6

the case law." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1980, Ls.9-13.) More specifically, counsel asserted
that the "issue" was "whether or not there [was] a new and significant material
line of cross-examination that was not explored in the prior examination." (Tr.,
Vol. 111, p.1980, Ls.18-22.) Counsel asserted "the significant material that was
not touched upon at the preliminary hearing is this:"
The jury is not going to hear, if you admit this testimony, the fact
that he did not have counsel; that they did not have Miranda
warnings; that they never explained to them what a declaration was
and the federal law behind it; they never got their Fifth Amendment
rights against self-incrimination. None of that due process of rights
ever existed. Or I shouldn't say never existed, but they were never
informed of those rights .
. . . [W]hen it comes to the point when Jose and Balvina testify, the
jury ought to hear what it is that Balvina and Jose did not know.
And so they couldn't have adopted the statements from 2006 and
2011 because they didn't have those - they didn't have knowledge
of what they were doing. They didn't have knowledge of how it
implicated them. It wasn't free and clear and constitutionally sound.
So that is the significant material line of questioning that never got
into the prelim.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1982, L.4 - p.1983, L.3.)
The declarations to which counsel was referring were written statements
by Jose and Balvina; Jose signed his statement in 2009 and Balvina signed hers
in 2006. (Exhibits 184, 185. 6) Jose's statement was admitted at the preliminary
hearing as a recorded recollection. (6/15/2011 P.H. Tr., p.388, Ls.6-10, p.390,
L.15 - p.391, L.25; Exhibits 19, 19A.) With respect to the admission of (hose
statements as exhibits at trial, Lopez-Orozco asserted:
Now, if we talk about the issue of whether or not they are
allowed to bring in or to submit on the record in the record the

6

Exhibits 184 and 185 are included in the record but were not admitted at trial.
(R., Vol. IV, Certificate of Exhibits, p.6.)
7

actual statements, those statements that were signed by Jose and
Balvina, I believe in 2006, and the ones that were allegedly
adopted, quote unquote, by those witnesses in 2011, that is not
permitted.
And I think part of that issue is number one, 803(8) talks
about the not allowed to bring in investigative reports or stuff done
by law enforcement for preparation of a charge if it's done in the
course of scope of the investigation unless the defendant brings
them in. So you are prohibited by 803(8) from doing that.
And then the case law, if you take a look at -- under 804(b)
there is a case in there, adaptations, on page 925 and 926, Beco
Construction Company versus City of Idaho falls, where it says that
"an affidavit of a witness prepared in summary judgment cannot be
admitted at trial." So it's hearsay.
So what the courts have allowed, you can read the affidavit
or recommendation if you find that it's an exception, or you can play
the preliminary hearing transcript but you are not allowed to
introduce it into evidence. Now that is my reading of that.
Now, that is the way I read the rules and the case law,
Judge. So they are not allowed to use or bring that material in for
purposes of exhibits or anything else like that.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1979, L.3 - p.1980, L.8.)
The district court ruled that if Jose and Balvina were "found to be
unavailable," the preliminary hearing testimony could be admitted. (Tr., Vol. Ill,
p.1991, Ls.11-16.)

The court also found Lopez-Orozco had an adequate

opportunity to examine the witnesses at the preliminary hearing (Tr., Vol. Ill,
p.1991, L.17 - p.1993, L.5), and that the "evidence in question is of a material
fact and that the State could not procure other evidence on that issue through
reasonable efforts" (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1994, Ls.2-7).

With respect to the written

statements, the court found the requirements of I.RE. 803(5) were satisfied for
purposes of admissibility. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1995, L.5 - p.1997, L.9.)

8

After Jose took the stand, the following colloquy occurred:
Q. Sir, do you recall any statements that the defendant made in
your presence about his leaving Idaho in 2002?

A. No.
Q.
Sir, do you recall any statements that you gave to law
enforcement about what you overheard the defendant say?

A. No.
Q. Sir, do you recall the testimony that you provided on June 15t\
2011 on these very issues?

A. No.
And sir, is your lack of recall due to the length in time since
2002, when these events occurred?
Q.

A. Maybe.
Q. It's been a long time for you?

A. Yes.
Q. And this has been a very emotionally charged issue for you?

A. Too emotional.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2017, L.23 - p.2018, L.18 (bold omitted).)
After the foregoing preliminary questions, the prosecutor asked the court
to find Jose "unavailable under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3)." (Tr., Vol. Ill,
p.2018, Ls.20-23.) The court asked defense counsel if he "would like to ask Mr.
Orozco [any questions] concerning ... his unavailability," and counsel declined.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2020, Ls.12-19.) When asked for "any additional argument ...
concerning the State's request," defense counsel requested the court "to make
the distinction between what is happening here and what happened in State

9

versus Barcella 7 , a refusal to testify versus an inability to recall." (Tr., Vol. Ill,
p.2020, L.20 - p.2021, L.2.) The court did as counsel requested and noted that,
unlike Barcella, which involved a refusal to testify, there was a "lapse of memory
rather than a refusal to testify." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2022, Ls.12-14.)
On appeal, Lopez-Orozco first argues that the district court erred "when it
found Jose was unavailable under Idaho Rule of Evidence 804(a)(3)."
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) Lopez-Orozco's argument regarding unavailability relies
on two related premises: (1) Jose "merely lacked memory of having made the
out-of-court statements" but did not "lack[ ] memory of the subject matter"
(Appellant's Brief, p.7), and (2) the "prosecutor's inquiry was insufficient to
establish that Jose had no memory of the subject matter" (Appellant's Brief, p.8).
This argument should not be considered because it is not preserved.
"The threshold inquiry in any appeal is whether an issue presented for
review was preserved by a timely and specific objection at trial."
Stevens, 115 Idaho 457, 459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989).

State v.
If not

preserved, the appellate court generally will not consider the issue absent a
showing of fundamental error. State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, _ , 334 P.3d
806, 815 (2014); Stevens, 115 Idaho at 459, 767 P.2d at 834.
Lopez-Orozco did not object to the prosecutor's questions as inadequate
for purposes of establishing Jose's unavailability.

His only objection, to the

extent it could be considered an objection, was that there needed to be a
determination whether Jose was refusing to testify or could not remember. This

7

State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 16 P.3d 288 (Ct. App. 2000).
10

is a different inquiry than the one Lopez-Orozco is asking this Court to make on
appeal. Lopez-Orozco's appellate argument is essentially predicated on a claim
of inadequate foundation, not a claim that Jose was not unavailable because he
was refusing to testify.

"[A]n objection on one ground will not be deemed

sufficient to preserve for appeal all objections that could have been raised."
Stevens, 115 Idaho at 459, 767 P.2d at 834. Because Lopez-Orozco's appellate
argument regarding unavailability involves a different assertion than the one he
raised below, this Court should decline to consider it.
Even if considered, Lopez-Orozco has failed to show the district court
erred in declaring Jose unavailable under I.RE. 804(a). Rule of Evidence 804
defines unavailability as including situations in which the declarant "testifies to a
lack of memory of the subject matter of declarant's statement." I.RE. 804(a)(3).
"The proponent of the hearsay evidence bears the burden of proving the
declarant's unavailability." State v. Fair, 156 Idaho 431, _ , 327 P.3d 989, 992
(Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted). In determining that a witness is unavailable
due to lack of memory, the relevant inquiry is not whether the witness recalls
making a statement, but whether the witness does not remember the '"subject
matter' of the out-of-court statements." Fair, 156 Idaho at_, 327 P.3d at 993
(quoting Milburn v. State, 135 Idaho 701, 708, 23 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2000)).
Before being deemed unavailable on this basis, the plain language of I.RE.
804(a)(3) requires the witness to testify to such lack of memory. Milburn, 135
Idaho at 708, 23 P.3d at 782.

11

The subject matter of Jose's statement at issue in this case is what LopezOrozco told him in 2002 about why he left Idaho. When asked if he remembered
any of those statements, Jose answered, "No."

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2017, L.23 -

p.2018, L.1.) Jose also testified that he did not recall any of the statements he
made to law enforcement regarding what Lopez-Orozco told him and did not
recall his prior testimony on the subject. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2018, Ls.2-9.)
Lopez-Orozco claims "Jose's statements in this case indicated that he
merely lacked memory of having made the out-of-court statements, not that he
lacked memory of the subject matter."
contradicts this claim.

(Appellant's Brief, p.7.)

The record

Jose's testimony that he did not remember any of the

statements Lopez-Orozco made to him "in 2002 about why left Idaho" has
nothing to do with Jose's "memory" of his own out-of-court statements - the
question and answer instead go squarely to whether he remembered LopezOrozco's statements.
Lopez-Orozco next argues "Jose's responses do not show that he lacked
a memory of the subject matter" and claims that, "because of the way the
prosecutor phrased the questions, Jose's answers could indicate that only [sic]
does Jose not recall any statements, but also that he never heard any
statements made by the defendant about his leaving Idaho." (Appellant's Brief,
p.8.)

That Lopez-Orozco speculates that Jose may have been answering a

different question than the one asked falls far short of demonstrating error in the
district court's finding

that Jose was unavailable.

Lopez-Orozco's

re-

interpretation of Jose's negative response to the question, "do you recall any

12

statements that the defendant made in your presence about his leaving Idaho in
2002" as meaning Lopez-Orozco did not make any statements at all is also
inconsistent with what is readily apparent from the entirety of the prosecutor's
initial examination of Jose, which established Jose was unable to recall the
relevant subject matter or his own prior statements and testimony regarding the
subject matter.

Lopez-Orozco has failed to show error in the district court's

determination that Jose was unavailable as a witness at trial.
If a declarant is unavailable as a witness, prior testimony by the declarant
is not subject to exclusion by the hearsay rule if the testimony was "given as a
witness at another hearing of the same or a different proceeding" and the "the
party against whom the testimony is now offered ... had an opportunity and
similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."
I.R.E. 804(b)(1). Idaho Code Section 9-336 sets forth the requirements for using

preliminary hearing testimony of a witness declared unavailable at trial. Under
that statute, before admitting preliminary hearing testimony, the trial court "must
find that the testimony offered is:"
1. Offered as evidence of a material fact and that the testimony is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence with the proponent can procure through reasonable
efforts;and
2. That the witness is, after diligent and good faith attempts to
locate, unavailable for the hearing; and
3. That at the preliminary hearing, the party against whom the
admission of the testimony is sought had an adequate opportunity
to prepare and cross-examine the proffered testimony.

13

I.C. § 9-336; see State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho 524, _ , 328 P.3d 504, 510
(2014) (noting I.C. § 9-336 "permits the admission of preliminary hearing
testimony of an unavailable witness at trial subject to three findings by the district
court"); State v. Cross, 132 Idaho 667, 669, 978 P.2d 227, 229 (1999) ("To
determine the admissibility of preliminary hearing testimony under I.C. § 9-336, a
trial court must make factual findings as the three requirements.").
The only requirement Lopez-Orozco claims was not satisfied under I.C. 9336 is that he was unavailable.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.9-11.)

already stated, Lopez-Orozco's claim in this regard fails.

For the reasons

Accordingly, he has

failed to show error in the admission of his preliminary hearing testimony.
Lopez-Orozco next asserts that the court erred when it allowed his 2009
statement to be read to the jury.

(Appellant's Brief, p.11.)

More specifically,

Lopez-Orozco argues "the requisite safeguards to insure the probable accuracy
of the statement were not present" because "the unsworn statement was not
prepared by Jose, substantial time had lapsed between the event and the
preparation of the unsworn statement, Jose never adopted the unsworn
statement, and it did not accurately reflect Jose's knowledge in 2002."
(Appellant's Brief, p.11.) The Court should also decline to consider this argument
on appeal because it is not preserved.
Lopez-Orozco's only objection at trial with respect to Jose's 2009 written
statement was that the statement itself could not be admitted as an exhibit, but
could only be read into evidence.

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1979, L.3 - p.1980, L.8.)

Lopez-Orozco did not claim at trial, as he does now, that the statement did not

14

satisfy the requirements of a recorded recollection. 8 This Court should, therefore,
decline to consider Lopez-Orozco's argument that it did not.
Even if considered, Lopez-Orozco has failed to show the district court
erred in admitting Jose's 2009 statement as a recorded recollection. Idaho Rule
of Evidence 803(5) provides that a recorded recollection is not excluded by the
hearsay rule. A recorded recollection is defined as:
A memorandum or record concerning a matter about which a
witness once had knowledge but now has insufficient recollection to
enable the witness to testify fully and accurately, shown to have
been made or adopted by the witness when the matter was fresh in
the memory of the witness and to reflect that knowledge correctly.
I.R.E. 803(5).
Applying the foregoing standards, the district court stated:
The Court would find that based upon the information
contained in the preliminary hearing transcript, at least it appears
that the statements were made or adopted by the witness when the
matter was fresh in their memory, there is no time limit as to when
that occurs. But it does appear to me from the information and
evidence provided that the element has been established and does,
in fact, appear to correctly reflect the knowledge at that time.
Therefore, the Court does find that that would come in pursuant to
803(5).
In addition, the Court also notes and acknowledges the
magistrate's findings, which the Court finds to be appropriate, as
well. The issues related to coercion or alleged coercion or threats
or anything such as that goes more to weight than to admissibility.
As long as the State is able to provide the necessary foundation
from 803(5) those recollections should be made available to the
jury for their consideration.

8

Although Lopez-Orozco did object on this basis at the preliminary hearing
(6/15/2011 P.H. Tr., p.388, Ls.14-18, p.389, Ls.4-15, p.390, Ls.10-14), he did not
do so at trial although the preliminary hearing objection and the court's ruling
thereon was included in the portion of the preliminary hearing transcript that was
read to the jury (Tr., Vol. 111, p.2059, L.22 - p.2061, L.2, p.2061, L.24 - p.2062,
L.24).
15

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.1996, L.14 - p.1997, L.9.)
The record supports the district court's findings.

After denying any

memory of several statements Jose previously claimed Lopez-Orozco made to
him, the prosecutor asked Jose to review his 2009 statement to see if it refreshed
his recollection. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2056, L.11 - p.2057, L.20.) After Jose reviewed
the statement and again denied any memory of certain statements he told law
enforcement he heard Lopez-Orozco make, the prosecutor asked Jose whether,
at the time Jose signed the statement, it truthfully said what he remembered.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2057, L.22 - p.2058, L.20.) Jose answered:

"Yes.

I couldn't

really remember much." (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2058, L.21.) Jose and the prosecutor
then engaged in the following exchange:
Q. Okay.
2009?

Does the Statement set forth what you remember in

A. That is part of the Statement that I gave in 2002 that is in the
front of it.
Q. Right. You provided a statement in 2002, correct?

A. Yes.
Q. And what you were told was put in this document in 2009,
correct?

A. Seems that way.
Q. So when you signed this in 2009, was it true?

A. That's what I said before.
Q.
Okay.
And today you don't remember everything you
remembered in 2002?

A. No.
16

Q. And today you don't remember everything you remembered in
2009?

A. No.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2058, L.22 - p.2059, L.15 (bold omitted).)
Based on Jose's testimony regarding the contents of the 2009 statement,
the requirements for admission of a recorded recollection under I.RE. 803(5)
were satisfied. Lopez-Orozco argues otherwise, asserting the statement was not
admissible because it was "not prepared by Jose, it was never adopted by Jose,
and it did not accurately reflect his knowledge in 2002." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.)
Jose's testimony is directly contrary to this argument. That Jose also provided
testimony in which he contradicted himself with respect to the statement
(Appellant's Brief, p.15 n.3) does not, for purposes of I.RE. 803(5), negate his
ultimate acknowledgment that the statement was correct.

Lopez-Orozco has

failed to show any error in the admission of the contents of his 2009 statement.

D.

Even If This Court Finds Error In Relation To The Admission Of Jose's
Preliminary Hearing Testimony And The Contents Of Jose's Prior Written
Statement, Any Error Is Harmless
Even if the Court finds the district court erred in admitting Jose's

preliminary hearing testimony and the content of his 2009 written statement, any
error is harmless.
"In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant
relief on appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties."
State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, _ , 334 P.3d 806, 813-814 (2014) (quotations
and citations omitted). In determining whether an evidentiary error affected the
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defendant's substantial rights, the appellate court considers a number of factors
"including the importance of the witness' testimony to the prosecution's case,
whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the
extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the
prosecution's case."

!sL (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 366, 247

P.3d 582, 593 (2010)).

"To establish harmless error, the State must prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained." Parker, 157 Idaho at_, 334 P.3d at 814.
Jose's preliminary hearing testimony, which was read to the jury, was that
in July and August of 2002, Jose was living with his sister Balvina in San Jose.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2048, Ls.3-16.) Jose testified that, at one point, Lopez-Orozco
came to Balvina's apartment.

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2048, Ls.20-22, p.2050, Ls.4-7.)

While at Balvina's apartment, Jose overheard Lopez-Orozco tell Balvina that
"someone had been wanting to kill him" and that he had picked Rebecca up from
her father's house in Nyssa, Oregon and "was with [Rebecca] in the car." (Tr.,
Vol. Ill, p.2056, L.6 - p.2057, L.4.) The written statement Jose signed in 2009
included the following information:
[l]n late July or early August of 2002, Simon Lopez Orozco ..
, who is also my brother, brought Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] to the
apartment that I shared with my sister Balvina in San Jose,
California. That night Jorge [Lopez-Orozco], Simon, and Balvina
were sitting at the kitchen table, and I was in the living room.
Jorge seemed sad and desperate when he told Balvina and
Simon how he had killed Rebecca, also known as Becky, and the
children. Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] said that he had also burned his
vehicle, a white Grand Am, with Rebecca and the children inside.
18

Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] didn't say how he burned the vehicle. Jorge
[Lopez-Orozco] didn't say where this happened.
I also heard Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] say the following: Becky
was in Oregon visiting her father, and she called Jorge [LopezOrozco] and asked him to pick her up. Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] drove
to Oregon in a white Grand Am vehicle. When he arrived to pick
her up, Becky didn't want to go with him.
Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] was on his way back to Idaho when
Becky called him again and asked him to go back to pick her up.
Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] returned to Oregon to pick up Becky. When
he arrived, he noticed some suspicious individuals in the area.
Becky and her two children left with Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] to
Idaho. The suspicious individual started following them in a truck
and fired bullets at them. Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] wasn't hit, and he
was able to get rid of the individuals.
At some point in time a police car was behind them but didn't
stop them. Becky was telling Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] that she would
tell the police that he was keeping her against her will. Becky
threatened to throw one of the children out of the window if Jorge
[Lopez-Orozco] didn't stop the car. Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] didn't
stop the car.
Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] reacted to Becky's threats and shot
her. Then Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] took her body to a field and
burned it inside the vehicle. Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] didn't mention in
detail what happened with the children.
I was able to hear Jorge [Lopez-Orozco] say all of this
because the kitchen where the conversation took place was beside
the living room where I was.
(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.5, L.5 - p.2073, L. (24 (quotation marks and number identifying
paragraphs from statement omitted).)
In addition to the admissions Lopez-Orozco made to Jose, he also made
statements to another brother, Simon.

Simon's former partner, Maria Garcia,

testified that Simon left home in the early morning hours one day in late July
2002 after receiving a phone call from another brother, Leobardo, who asked him
19

to go with him to pick up Lopez-Orozco.

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2128, L.18 - p.2129,

L.14.) After leaving, Simon called Maria and told her to meet him at a gas station
and bring him their truck and any cash she had available. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2130,
L.15 - p.2132, L.24.) When Maria met Simon at the gas station, he was with
Lopez-Orozco and Leobardo.

(Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2166, Ls.8-16.)

Maria gave the

truck and the money to Simon and Simon, who was acting nervous, told her they
had to be in California because Lopez-Orozco had a fight with someone, that
there was a shooting, and that someone was injured or possibly dead. (Tr., Vol.
Ill, p.2170, L.4-p.2171, L.16.)
The testimony at trial also corroborated many of the other details from
Jose's statement and there was substantial evidence supporting Lopez-Orozco's
convictions. After Jose's preliminary hearing testimony was read into evidence,
the state called Balvina as a witness. Balvina said she thought she remembered
Lopez-Orozco coming to her apartment in August 2002 and acknowledged that
Jose was also there. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2080, Ls.9-13, p.2081, Ls.1-2.) Although
Balvina denied Lopez-Orozco made any statements about why he left Idaho (Tr.,
Vol. Ill, p.2076, Ls.8-11 ), she also testified that Lopez-Orozco told her "someone
had followed him because he wanted the girl," there were shots fired at him but
he got away, and that a police car had followed him but did not stop him. (Tr.,
Vol. Ill, p.2112, L.7-p.2113, L.1.) Balvina said she did not see or talk to LopezOrozco again after he left her apartment. (Tr., Vol. lll,p.2114, Ls.7-12.) She did,
however, see Lopez-Orozco's wife and their children after Lopez-Orozco left
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when they came to stay with her for "maybe" two weeks before they left to
Mexico. (Tr., Vol. Ill, p.2115, L.6-p.2116, L.1.)
Lopez-Orozco's flight to California and then Mexico right after he
murdered Rebecca, R.R., and M.H., was corroborated not only by Balvina, but
also by evidence demonstrating that Lopez-Orozco quickly fled his residence in
Mountain Home, all of which demonstrates Lopez-Orozco's consciousness of
guilt. (Tr., Vol. II, p.1660, L.14 - p.1666, L.2.)
Perhaps most damning was the evidence establishing that Lopez-Orozco
was the last person seen with Rebecca and her two children while they were still
alive and the evidence that three individuals met Lopez-Orozco on a dark road in
the early morning hours of July 30 or 31, 2002, after Lopez-Orozco called "Beto"
and asked him to bring him some gasoline.

(Tr., Vol. II, pp.1115-1116

(Rebecca's daughter, Noemi, testifying she last saw her mother and two little
brothers with Lopez-Orozco when he picked them up in Nyssa); pp.1166-1186
(Liliana Pedroza's testimony about taking Lopez-Orozco gas along with "Beto"
and Peggy Larios), pp.1237-1247 (Peggy Larios' testimony corroborating
Pedroza's story about taking gas to an individual in the early morning hours),
p.1669, Ls.16-25 (Rebecca's father said he last saw Rebecca alive on July 30
between 6:00 p.m. and 7:00 p.m. when she left with Orozco); Tr., Vol. Ill,
pp.1791-1800 (gas station attendant corroborates story about individuals coming
to get gas and trying to put gas in milk jugs).) Liliana Pedroza testified that when
they took the gas to Lopez-Orozco's location, she saw someone in the
passenger seat with a cowboy hat covering the person's face and "blankets or
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clothes or something in the back seat." (Tr., Vol. II, pp.1189-1190.) When Beto
gave Lopez-Orozco the gasoline, he poured it into empty milk jugs, not into his
car. (Tr., Vol. II, p.1186, Ls.9-20.) In addition, the evidence established that the
charred remains of Rebecca and her two children were found in Lopez-Orozco's
car - the same car he was last seen driving when he was with them. (Tr., Vol. II,
p.1115, Ls.6-15, p.1705, Ls.10-12, p.1726, L.20 - p.1729, L.25; Exhibit 172A.)
Finally, Lopez-Orozco's own statements made to law enforcement after he
was extradited are evidence of his guilt and his non-credible efforts to account for
the evidence against him. (See generally Exhibit 187.)
Given the overwhelming evidence presented at trial, this Court can
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that even without Jose's preliminary
hearing testimony and the contents of his 2009 statement, the jury would have
found Lopez-Orozco guilty of all three counts of first-degree murder.

The

evidentiary error Lopez-Orozco claims on appeal is therefore harmless and does
not warrant any relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Lopez-Orozco's
judgment of conviction for three counts of first-degree murder.
DATED this 4 th day of November, 2014.
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